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Can civil society simultaneously be duty-bearers and rights-holders? In global human rights discourse, the term 'civil society' is commonly used in two seemingly opposing ways. The first is the use of 'civil society' as denoting an extended duty-bearer in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which by many states across the world are being tasked with directly implementing human rights-based policies. In this use, 'civil society' is conceived as a more benevolent and decentralised actor than the state, albeit in close partnership with the latter: a proxy-state. Another common use of the term is to conceive of 'civil society' as (representing) rights-holders, a use we often see when talking of less democratic states, where we are reminded that civil society is a subject of human rights in itself - an actor needing to preserve rights such as freedom of association and expression in the face of shrinking civic space. In this use, 'civil society' is an organised aggregation of citizens - not a proxy-state, but rather a proxy-citizen. The purpose of the present paper is to account for and discuss the compatibility of these two uses of 'civil society' within the human rights field from an empirical and practice-based perspective. In particular, we are looking at partnerships between ‘civil society’ and the state in two very different contexts: Sweden, a social democratic, yet also privatising state where civil society and the state are extremely closely knit when it comes to human rights implementation; and India, which for decades has been on a neoliberal path but is currently autocratising and shrinking the space for civil society. Based on fieldwork with child rights-based CSOs that work in partnership with the state in these two states, we make three points. First, civil society actors in both countries conceived of their own role in relation to the state and to citizens in remarkably similar terms, namely by arguing that it is crucial to have a 'foot in both camps' and by conceptualising themselves as working in the 'in-between' or filling a 'gap' between state and citizen. We then take this finding to argue for the importance of human rights theory to not conceive of civil society as either duty-bearers or rights-holders, but rather as actors who can and should have both roles simultaneously. Hereunder, with the example of India, we illustrate how CSOs due to the increasing autocratisation find themselves having to choose between being coopted by the state (being solely duty-bearers) or cease to exist (not being able to represent rights-holders, thus losing the possibility of rights in the first place). In other words, the answer to whether CSOs working in partnership with the state can be both duty-bearers and rights-holders is not only 'yes,' it is that they must be both, and that we in a polarizing world with increasing autocratisation risk losing rights because we lose civil society’s double roles.